Subnational shielding: institutional quality and special venue privilege in brazilian federalism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5020/2317-2150.2026.16887Keywords:
special jurisdictional prerogative, subnational federalism, institutional quality, csQCA, natural language processingAbstract
Brazilian federalism grants subnational units the autonomy to define the rules for the original criminal jurisdiction of their authorities. This article investigates the determinants of this prerogative's expansion at the state level, testing the hypothesis that special jurisdictional prerogatives (the so-called "privileged forum") act as a political survival mechanism in environments of low state capacity. Methodologically, the study innovates by employing Natural Language Processing (NLP) to mine current (2024) constitutional texts, overcoming the obsolescence of secondary databases. The analytical framework combines correlations (Pearson and Spearman) with crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA), intersecting forum intensity with Transparency (EBT), Government Efficacy (CLP), and Party Fragmentation (ENP). Findings indicate a strong trend of negative association between government efficacy and forum intensity. The csQCA reveals that the perfect storm (a configuration of low transparency, low efficacy, and high fragmentation) constitutes a sufficient condition for the hypertrophy of jurisdictional shielding. Atypical subnational jurisdictions are an institutional response to high political transaction costs and regional governance deficits.
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