The relationship between party motivation and the agency dilemma in the constitution of the Brazilian Judicial Council
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5020/2317-2150.2023.13921Keywords:
Brazilian Judicial Council, principal-agent, Elster, party motivation, agency problemAbstract
This paper does a new reading of the process of creation of the National Council of Justice in regards to the dialogue between the theories of methodological individualism of Elster and of the principal-agent, to evidence how the dilemma of agency was subverted by the party motivation of judicial members, dislocating the legislative decision of Constitutional Emenda number 45/2004 to a point closer to the interest of the Judiciary. It is a descriptive-cognitive research, guided by systematic literature review, in which the result exposes the genesis of the cited council under a new theoretical support that translates, in an adjusted way, the empiric observations existent about the phenomenon. The research contributes to the agenda that is about the control agencies and judicial councils, providing another tool to instrument the themes of this area.
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Copyright (c) 2023 José Vinicius da Costa Filho, João Luis Binde, André Valente do Couto

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