Anguish in Kierkegaard in Different Existential Appropriations: Humanist and Phenomenological

Abstract

This theoretical study aims to clarify whether two existential perspectives in psychology, humanistic and phenomenological, can be understood in their studies and practices as having the same development and foundation as the topic of anguish. To do so, firstly, we describe the conception of anguish, as developed by Søren A. Kierkegaard, and then we show how the two perspectives appropriate to what the philosopher elaborated. We chose this scholar because we know that anguish, as he understands it, has become paradigmatic in different studies on the human psyche and has been widely discussed in these two perspectives of psychology. The guiding question of this study was to know whether the divergences in how understanding the concept of anguish alone are sufficient for possible clarification of two distinct perspectives. To clarify this issue, we studied in detail the content of the work The Concept of Anguish by Søren A. Kierkegaard, and we carried out bibliographical research on the writings of Rollo May, a psychologist with the existential-humanist approach who delved into the studies of this topic from a perspective of psychology and psychotherapy and, finally, we sought, in the studies of Feijoo and Protasio, who delved deeper into the theme of anguish from an existential-phenomenological perspective, how these authors appropriate the conception of anguish developed by the philosopher, also from a perspective in psychology and psychotherapy. In general terms, we saw that anguish, as understood by Rollo May, is divided into regular and pathological; in the understanding of Feijoo and Protasio, anguish points to an original indeterminacy that is the foundation of freedom. We conclude, therefore, that these two perspectives diverge concerning understanding the concept of anguish and, consequently, in their respective clinical actions.